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[The] technique of subliminal projection could not fail to arouse
the most intense interest among the world's mass entertainees. For
the new technique was aimed directly at them, and its purpose was
to manipulate their minds without their being aware of what was
being done to them.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, because of advances in technology, people are being sub-
jected to subliminal messages during many of their daily activities.2
Television,3 movies,4 magazines,' and even department stores,6 expose
the public to messages below the threshold of conscious perception.
Studies indicate that similar messages in the form of weak stimuli can
influence behavior even though they are not perceptible to the
1. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 78-79 (1965).
2. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 91 & 93 and accompanying text.
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receiver.7 Three main methods of subliminal stimulation have shown
strong behavioral effects:8 visual messages that are flashed before a
viewer so quickly or so dimly that they are not noticed (subvisual);
vocal messages that are either played at sound levels too low to be
consciously perceived or at tonal frequencies too high to be con-
sciously understood (subaudible); and images hidden inside photo-
graphs and drawings (embedding).
The potential for manipulating behavior is at odds with revered
concepts of personal autonomy and free will because the viewer does
not have the opportunity to consciously evaluate the messages.
Courts, therefore, are being called upon to decide whether subliminal
communication is protected under the first amendment. The task is
difficult, however, because subliminal communications do not fit into
established first amendment doctrines.9 The authors of the first
amendment scarcely could have conceived of the constitutional issues
that would arise with the advent of the telephone, motion pictures,
television, satellite communications, and other innovations of modern
society. 10
The prospect of subliminal communication as a means of public
manipulation first arose in 1957 when James Vicary, an advertising
executive with a psychology background, announced that he had
developed a technique that subjected consumers to an "irresistible"
advertising message that was dimly displayed during a movie.II
Vicary claimed that although audiences were unaware of the messages
projected onto the screen during the showing of the movie, these pro-
jected messages accounted for dramatically increased sales of Coca-
Cola and popcorn.I2 Legislators and the public were outraged at the
possible implications of subliminal communication.1 3 While these
7. Moore, Subliminal Advertising: What You See Is What You Get, 46 J. MARKETING 38,
40 (1982).
8. Id. at 39.
9. "The various forms of modem so-called 'mass communications' raise issues that were
not implied in the means of communication known or contemplated by Franklin and Jefferson
and Madison." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
10. See Katsh, The First Amendment and Technological Change: The New Media Have a
Message, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459 (1989) (Energizing ways of communications, some
more efficient than others, are leading many to reconsider what is within first amendment
protection.).
11. Moore, Subliminal Delusion, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July 1985, at 10.
12. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
13. W. KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION 21 (1973). An example of the outrage could be
found in the Saturday Review which stated:
The subconscious mind is the most delicate part of the most delicate
apparatus in the entire universe. It is not to be smudged, sullied or twisted in
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claims were not supported by other evidence, 14 Congress introduced
bills in 1958 and 1959's to restrict this type of subliminal communica-
tion. Although no bill relating to subliminal communication ever
made it out of committee,1 6 advances in electronic communication
have led to a resurgence in the movement to restrict subliminal
speech.1 7
Advocates of subliminal communication contend that it is a form
of speech protected by the first amendment.' This contention is
based on the belief that subliminal communication, like other forms of
speech, is "a valued liberty both as a means and as an ends."' 9 The
advocates maintain that the ability to express oneself as one sees fit
furthers "individual liberty, autonomy and self development."20
Accordingly, it is reasoned, for individuals to realize their full poten-
tial, they must control their own destinies by being able to make life-
affecting choices that help them attain the goals they have set.21
Thus, -being able to express oneself the way one chooses is an impor-
tant element of self development.
Contrarily, others believe that subliminal perception is the
antithesis of freedom.22 They contend that subliminally implanted
messages violate the free will, personal autonomy, and the innermost
privacy of individuals' minds and thoughts. They reason that if either
order to boost the sales of popcorn or anything else. Nothing is more difficult in
the modern world than to protect the privacy of the human soul.
Smudging the Subconscious, SATURDAY REv., Oct. 5, 1957, at 40.
14. Moore, supra note 11, at 10.
15. H.R. 10802, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. 11363, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958); H.R.
1998, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
16. Bliss, Subliminal Projection: History and Analysis, 5 CoMM./ENT. L.J. 419, 426
(1983).
17. See, eg., Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying
Summary Judgment at 26); Gurnick, Subliminal Advertising: Threat to Consumer Autonomy?,
BEVERLY HILLS B.J. 56 (1987); Reed & Whitman, A Constitutional and Policy-Related
Evaluation of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Nonverbal Techniques in Legal Advertising, B.Y.U.
L. REv. 265 (1988); Note, Judicial Recognition and Control of New Media Techniques" In
Search of the "Subliminal Tort," 14 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 733 (1981) [hereinafter Note,
Judicial Recognition]; Note, The Subconscious Taken Captive: A Social, Ethical and Legal
Analysis of Subliminal Communication Technology, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1077 (1981)
[hereinafter Note, Subconscious Taken Captive].
18. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 28, Vance v. Judas Priest (D. Nev.
1989) (No. 86-5844/86-3939). "Subliminal lyrics are no different from nonsubliminal lyrics.
They are a form of speech or expression.... The First Amendment applies to all kinds of
speech. Subliminal lyrics are therefore presumptively entitled to its protection." Id
19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
20. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUMONAL LAW 979 (9th ed. 1985).
21. Reddish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593 (1982).
22. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 25-26).
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the form or expression of subliminal speech is unduly intrusive, it may
be limited.23 However, established first amendment doctrine does not
lend itself towards dealing with subliminal communication.
When the question arises as to whether a new kind of expression
falls within the protection of the first amendment, it must be assessed
by standards suited to it and be evaluated according to the problems it
presents.24 While the right of free speech has never been held to be
absolute, the guarantees of the first amendment are perhaps more
cherished and expansive than those of any other constitutional right.25
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has devised "several
intermediate categories of less-than-complete constitutional protec-
tion for certain kinds of expression. ' 26 These categories include com-
mercial speech, obscene and offensive speech, child pornography, and
defamation. Given the special position that the first amendment
occupies in constitutional jurisprudence, if a new kind of expression
does not fall within one of these narrowly established exceptions, 27
great caution should be used before devising a new category of speech
that is not protected under the first amendment.
Restrictions upon subliminal communication may be hard to
square with the established rationale for not giving certain types of
speech the full protection of the first amendment. First, subliminal
transmission is arguably present in most expression, even if not inten-
tional. For example, subliminal expression can be found in paintings,
overt speech, body language, innuendo, and music.2" Further, ges-
23. Note, Subconscious Taken Captive, supra note 17, at 1131.
24. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
25. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) ("Of that freedom one may say that it
is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.").
26. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18, at 930 (2d ed. 1988) (footnotes
omitted).
27. There are four classes of speech which may be limited. They are: (1) obscene speech,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); (2) libel, slander, perjury, false advertising, solicitation
of crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy and the like, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961); (3) speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation
of a valid criminal statute, Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); and (4) speech
which is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and which is likely to
incite or produce such action, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also McCollum
v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 1000, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 192 (Ct. App. 1988) (same).
28. Examples of embedding can be found in works of several artists including Picasso,
Titian, and Rembrandt. W. KEY, supra note 13, at 114; see, e.g., W. KEY, THE CLAM PLATE
ORGY: AND OTHER SUBLIMINAL TECHNIQUES FOR MANIPULATING YOUR BEHAVIOR 58-61
(1980) [hereinafter W. KEY, CLAM PLATE]. Subliminal lyrics in music can be found in
compositions by The Beatles, The Who, and Simon and Garfunkel. W. KEY, MEDIA
SEXPLOITATION 116-45 (1976). Probably the best example of subliminal lyrics in music can be
found in the song "Strawberry Fields" on the Beatles' "Magical Mystery Tour" album. W.
KEY, supra note 13, at 119. While debatable, it is claimed that the words "I buried Paul" can
be heard at the end of "Strawberry Fields." Id.
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tures, body posture, eye control, setting, and tonal inflection all mod-
ify the meaning of speech.29  The pervasiveness of subliminal
communications within everyday speech may make it virtually impos-
sible to distinguish, before trial, allowable forms of subliminal trans-
mission from those forms disallowed. The bright line protection of
the first amendment could become hazy if subliminal communication
were treated differently than supraliminal speechW--speech within
the realm of conscious perception-because all speech is comprised of
both supraliminal3 and subliminal parts. 32 Any distinction that
relied upon the affect on the listener would chill free discourse
because the effect could not be pre-determined. Second, the sublimi-
nal phenomenon is difficult to identify and the "effects are not quanti-
fiable."' 33 This lack of objective data makes it hard to justify a new
limitation on the first amendment. 34 The difficulty in defining sublim-
inal communication, compounded with the difficulty in determining
which types should be restricted, would cause statutes limiting sub-
liminal communications to be very specific and narrow. Otherwise,
Congress runs the risk of drafting statutes that are either over-inclu-
sive or vague 33 and, thus, unconstitutional. Third, subliminal com-
munication does have value,36 unlike the specific forms of expression
that the Court has determined to be unprotected, such as obscene
speech.37 Specifically, subliminal elements can add tone and feeling to
a message. Finally, while speech can be restricted either because of
form or content, restricting subliminal communication poses greater
difficulties because subliminal communication does not fall neatly
within either category. Clearly, the content of subliminal messages, if
overt, would be protected speech unless they also fall within one of
the other proscribed categories of speech. However, if subliminal
speech is restricted simply because of its form, subliminal transmis-
sions would be restricted based on effects which may not be capable of
being proven. Thus, the balancing necessary to conclude that a form
29. Reed & Whitman, supra note 17, at 268.
30. Kiesel, Subliminal Seduction, 70 A.B.A. J., July 1984, at 27.
31. Note, Judicial Recognition, supra note 17, at 742. All sensory input is registered in
both a conscious and subconscious manner. Id Additionally, with the exception of taste (for
which tests have not yet been carried out), all sensory modalities have a subliminal fringe (i.e.,
pain, tactile, auditory, visual, olfactory, and thermal). N. DIXON, PRECONSCIOUS
PROCESSING 263-64 (1981).
32. Note, Judicial Recognition, supra note 17, at 742.
33. Gurnick, supra note 17.
34. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
35. R. ROTUNDA, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722 (1978).
36. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
37. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972) ("[T]his much has been categorically settled by
this court, that obscene material is unprotected by [the first] amendment.").
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of speech is intrusive would be a difficult, if not an impossible, under-
taking. 3s Perhaps because of these difficulties, subliminal communica-
tions have largely been left alone.39
Although the legislatures have not yet acted, at least one district
court has restricted subliminal communications by finding that such
communications are not entitled to first amendment protection.' In
Vance v. Judas Priest,41 the parents of James Vance and Raymond
Belknap sued the "heavy metal" rock band "Judas Priest," alleging
that subliminal lyrics42 on the album Stained Class caused Belknap's
38. "Where government aims at the noncommunicative impact of an act, the correct result
in any particular case thus reflects some 'balancing' of the competing interests." L. TIBE,
supra note 26, § 12-2, at 791.
39. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 37, Vance v. Judas Priest (D. Nev.
1989) (No. 86-5844/86-3939).
40. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 26).
41. Id
42. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-4, Vance v. Judas Priest (D. Nev.
1989) (No. 86-5844/86-3939). The lyrics of "Better By You, Better Than Me" are as follows,
with the subliminal lyrics in parentheses:
You can find a way to ease my passion
You listen to the blood flow in my veins
You hear the teaching of the wind
Tell her what I'm like within
I can't find the words; my mind is dim
It's better by you, better than me
Guess you'll have to tell her how I tried
To speak about some hell so long inside
Tell her now I've got to go, out in the streets
And down the shore
Tell her the world's not much for living for
It's better by you, better than me
Everybody, everybody knows,
Everybody, everybody knows.
Better by you, better than me (DO IT)
You can tell her what I want it to be (DO IT)
You can say what I only can see (DO IT)
It's better by you, better than me
Guess I'll have to change my way of living
Don't want to really know the way I feel
Guess I'll learn to fight and kill
Tell her not to wait until
They find my blood upon her windowsill
It's better by you, better than me
Everybody, everybody knows,
Everybody, everybody knows.
Better by you, better than me (DO IT)
You can tell her what I want it to be (DO IT)
1248
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suicide and Vance's attempted suicide. 43 In holding that subliminal
speech is not protected by the first amendment, the Nevada district
court held that "subliminal messages are inconsistent with any of the
theories offered to justify freedom of speech."" This restrictive hold-
ing poses a Serious threat to artistic freedoms that are fundamental to
the first amendment because many art forms, either accidentally or
purposely, incorporate subliminal techniques for a variety of reasons.
Entertainment, motion pictures, radio broadcasts, television, and
musical and dramatic works, in addition to political or ideological
speech, fall within the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
expression.4 5 As artistic expression is presumptively protected by the
You can say what I only can see (DO IT)
It's better by you, better than me (DO IT)
Id In addition to the subliminal lyrics in the song "Better By You, Better Than Me," the
plaintiffs also claimed that there were backwards masked lyrics: lyrics that have meaning
when played forwards and backwards. Id at 4-5. The plaintiffs also claimed that the subcon-
scious is able to decipher the "backwards" lyrics. The backwards masked lyrics that are
alleged to be in the song "White Heat, Red Hot" are: "Fuck the lord; fuck (suck) all of you,"
when the lyrics "deliver us/from all the fuss" are played backwards. Id On the song "Stained
Class," plaintiffs claimed that "sing my evil spirit" can be heard when "faithless continuum/
into the abyss" is played backwards. Id
43. Id On December 23, 1985, Belknap, 18, and Vance, 20, went to a playground at a
local church with a sawed-off 12-gauge shotgun. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939
(D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary Judgment at 4). During the day, both Belknap and
Vance had consumed beer and smoked marijuana, Id at 9. At the playground, Belknap placed
the end of the shotgun under his chin and pulled the trigger. Id at 2. Minutes later, Vance
did the same. Id While Belknap was successful in killing himself, however, Vance survived
the initial blast. Id at 4. After numerous operations, Vance remained horribly disfigured. Id
Vance died on November 20, 1988, of heart failure. Id
44. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 22). The court explained its decision as follows:
Several major theories have been advanced to justify the protection given to
free speech. They are: (1) the marketplace of ideas; (2) representative democracy
and self-government; and (3) individual self-fulfillment and self-realization....
The court concludes that the use of audio subliminal communications does
not advance any of these theories cited to justify free speech. Each of these
theories entails some measure of discussion, the free flow of ideas, and open and
robust debate among the participants. Under the marketplace theory, the free
exchange of ideas ultimately permits truth to prevail; under the self-government
theory, discussion and debate over political issues furthers our democratic system
of government; and under the self-fulfillment or self-realization theory, an
individual's ability to freely express himself to others enhances his personal
autonomy and development.
Audio subliminal communications are the antithesis of these theories. They
do not convey ideas or information to be processed by the listener so that he or
she can make an individual determination about its value. They do not enable an
individual to further his personal autonomy. Instead, they are intended to
influence and manipulate the behavior of the listener without his knowledge.
Id at 22-25.
45. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1980); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952).
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first amendment, courts must find sufficient justification to exclude
subliminal presentation.' When courts deal with this troublesome
issue, they must remember that "undifferentiated fear .. . is not
enough to overcome the right of freedom of expression. '47 The main
concern behind freedom of speech is the guarantee that each person
be given the full opportunity "for expression in all of its varied forms
to convey a desired message. "48
This Comment argues that the first amendment protects both
supraliminal and subliminal artistic expression. Section II defines sub-
liminal perception and illustrates how subliminal perception tech-
niques are commonly used. Section III discusses the narrowly defined
classes of speech that are not protected under the first amendment.
Section IV analyzes the exceptions to free speech, argues that sublimi-
nal communications do not fall within any of the unprotected classes,
and explains why subliminal speech should receive the same protec-
tion as supraliminal speech. The final Section of this Comment con-
cludes that subliminal artistic perception should be protected by the
first amendment for three reasons. First, subliminal perception
advances the purposes of the first amendment. Second, subliminal
communications are not new and comprise many aspects of supralim-
inal communication making distinctions between acceptable and
unacceptable subliminal communications difficult to discern. Finally,
the actual affects of subliminal perception are too uncertain to con-
clude that a recipient's right to personal autonomy and privacy out-
weighs the right to engage in subliminal communications.
II. SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION: Now You DON'T SEE IT,
Now You Do
Subliminal perception, defined as sensory input into the human
nervous system that circumvents conscious awareness,49 is not a new
phenomenon.50 The existence of the human subconscious has been
explored and documented by composers, artists, poets, philosophers,
and scientists." The first recorded mention of unconscious percep-
tion is attributed to Democritus (400 B.C.) who wrote that "much is
perceptible which is not perceived by us." 2 Aristotle, Montaigne,
Leibiniz, and Freud have all alluded to and explored the subcon-
46. See generally Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 73 (1976).
47. Tinker v. Des Moines'School, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
48. Young, 427 U.S. at 77.
49. W. KEY, supra note 13, at 11.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id at 19.
1250
SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION
scious. 5 3 Subliminal communication is an attempt to speak directly to
the subconscious. Today, however, subliminal perception connotes
concepts of manipulation and brainwashing. 54  This Section will
attempt to define subliminal perception, describe subliminal tech-
niques, and explore some of their recent applications.
A. Subliminal Stimuli
To many, seeing is believing. But, subliminal messages, by defi-
nition, are not consciously "seen" or "heard." Because one does not
perceive being subjected to subliminal stimuli, it is easy to assume that
subliminal affects are nonexistent." The causal impact that subliminal
messages have on subsequent behavior may not be consciously appre-
ciated. 6 Also, when coupled with the idea that subliminal perception
threatens individual autonomy and freedom of will, the social value of
subliminal communication is even easier to discount." People like to
believe that they are in full control of their destinies. However, while
the magnitude of the affects of subliminal perception are debated," it
53. aIL at 19-20.
54. Id at 18.
55. N. DIXON, supra note 31, at 182. William Key suggests that in America an
intellectual fad exists whereby nothing is "significant unless it can be consciously quantified."
W. KEY, supra note 13, at 11.
56. "Though seemingly ingrained in human nature, the conviction that personal behavior
is coherently and consciously chosen is largely illusory. In addition to conscious decision-
making, a variety of non-conscious influences also shape behavior." Reed & Whitman, supra
note 17, at 272.
57. W. KEY, supra note 13, at 11. It is actually this threat that makes subliminal
phenomena so much more distasteful than other forms of perception.
58. Compare N. DIXON, supra note 31, at 182 (Dixon discusses the positive effects of
subliminal perception and its relationship with the brain, the mind, and behavior.); Adams,
'Mommy and I Are One' Beaming Messages to Inner Space, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1982,
at 24 (There is evidence which suggests that subliminal messages can affect behavior.);
Weinstein, Drozdenko & Weinstein, Effects of Subliminal Cues in Print Advertising upon Brain
Response, Purchase Intention, and Simulated Purchase, in 3 ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER
PSYCHOLOGY 3 (. Olson & K. Sentis ed. 1986) (Subliminally embedded messages can be
influential in enhancing advertisements.) with Bevan, Subliminal Stimulation.: A Pervasive
Problem for Psychology, 61 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 81, 92 (1964) (Subliminal effects are so
slight that they should not be considered seriously as a technique to affect consumer sales.);
Moore, supra note 7, at 41 (The supposed influence of subliminal suggestions is contradicted
by much research evidence and is incompatible with theories of perception and motivation.);
Moore, supra note 11, at 10 (The claim that subliminal messages can effectively change overt
human behavior is not supported by any scientific documentation.).
Dr. Lloyd Silverman, a professor of psychology at New York University, claims that his
experiments and his subliminal psychodynamic activation method have demonstrated that the
subliminal presentation of emotionally charged messages can trigger unconscious thought and
alter future behavior. Adams, supra. Contra Balay & Shevrin, The Subliminal Psychodynamic
Activation Method, a Critical Review, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, March 1988, at 161, 171
(Balay and Shevrin criticize Dr. Silverman's research regarding psychodynamic activation and
1990] 1251
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is generally accepted that subliminal stimuli can influence at least cer-
tain types of behavior. 9
The parameters of subliminal perception have been outlined as
follows:
(1) The eliciting of contingent responses by stimulation below the
absolute awareness threshold, where this threshold is defined as the
lowest level of stimulus energy at which the subject ever reports
hearing or seeing anything of stimulus.
(2) The retrospective reporting by the subject that he neither saw
nor heard anything of stimulus.
(3) The occurrence of contingent responses, without reported
awareness of the stimulus, that differ qualitatively from those elic-
ited by the same stimulus when presented above the awareness of
threshold.6°
"Subliminal" literally means "below threshold. 61  When a
message is presented below one's conscious awareness, the informa-
tion is said to be presented subliminally.62 By appealing to uncon-
scious desires, a subliminally implanted message, theoretically, can
influence subsequent behavior.63 Unlike supraliminal communica-
tions, the recipient cannot consciously evaluate and discount the
received message. As a result, "people may be affected by external
disagree with Dr. Silverman's conclusion that psychodynamic activation effects have been
definitively established.).
While subliminal effects have been documented in laboratory experiments, scientists are
beginning to conclude that subliminal messages can affect individuals in everyday life. See
generally Bargh & Pietromonaco, Automatic Information Processing and Social Perception:
The Influence of Trait Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness on Impression
Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 437 (1982) ("It was concluded that
social stimuli of which people are not consciously aware can influence conscious judgment.");
Bornstein, Leone & Galley, The Generalizability of Subliminal Mere Exposure Effects:
Influence of Stimuli Perceived Without Awareness on Social Behavior, 53 J. PERSONALITY AND
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1070 (1987) (The article describes "three experiments investigating the
extent to which subliminal mere exposure effects are obtainable not only with simple stimuli
but also with complex human stimuli in social situations.").
59. See generally N. DIXON, supra note 31, at 182; W. KEY, supra note 13, at 11; Adams,
supra note 58; Weinstein, Drozdenko & Weinstein, supra note 58. Dr. Silverman has
reported that schizophrenic patients were helped when exposed to the message "mommy and
I are one" or "daddy and I are one." Adams, supra note 58, at 28. Subliminal exposure may
also affect people who are depressed or who stutter. Id. at 30.
60. Note, Subconscious Taken Captive, supra note 17, at 1081 (quoting N. DIXON,
SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION-THE NATURE OF A CONTROVERSY 18 (1971)).
61. Moore, supra note 11, at 10.
62. By presenting a message subconsciously, it is hoped that the message will appeal to an
unconscious desire or need. Eight hidden human needs have been documented: emotional
security, reassurance of worth, ego gratification, creative outlets, love objects, sense of power,
sense of roots, and immortality. Bliss, supra note 16, at 419 n. 1 (citing V. PACKARD, THE
HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957)).
63. See generally N. DIXON, supra note 31, at 182; Adams, supra note 58, at 24.
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stimulus of which they remain totally unaware. ' ' 6 .
B. Modes of Subliminal Communication
Essentially, there are "two systems," which can operate indepen-
dently from one another:65 the conscious and the subconscious. The
conscious is responsible for mediating between external stimuli and
overt responses while the subconscious is responsible for phenomenal
representation." Each of our senses has "a subliminal fringe" that
can be excited without conscious awareness of the excitation. Sublim-
inal communications take place within this fringe area.
Currently, the most commonly used and criticized methods of
subliminal communication are subaudible and subvisual. Subvisual
techniques include embedding,67 which involves quickly flashing pic-
tures or messages between frames in movies and television pro-
grams, 68 and dimly projecting the desired message onto the movie or
television screen too faintly to be noticed.69 Subvisual subliminal
transmission has found many applications. For example, subvisual
subliminal perception has been used to heighten tension in movies,70
to sell products, 1 to reduce aggressive impulses in schizophrenics,' 2
and even to try to apprehend a mass murderer.'3
In the early 1900's, Dr. 0. Poetzle, a contemporary of Sigmund
Freud, made one of the first significant discoveries relating to sublimi-
nal perception.74 Poetzle hypothesized that dream content was com-
prised of subliminally perceived stimuli. 75 His studies illustrated that
when subjects were exposed to subliminal stimuli without their
64. N. DIXON, supra note 31, at 9.
65. Id. at 10. To prove that the two systems operate independently, Dixon offers the fact
that people dream, experience imagery, and hallucinate "without their contents of
consciousness owing anything to concurrent external stimulation or... activity." Id.
66. Id
67. See generally W. KEY, supra note 13, at 20.
68. See infra notes 71 & 73 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 80 & 81 and accompanying text.
70. Bliss, supra note 16, at 423. In "T17he Exorcist," the face of Father Karras appears in
the film as a death mask. Id Additionally, a complete fox hunt is inter-cut throughout the
film that flashes by so fast that it is imperceptible to the conscious eye. Id.
71. Id at 425. To help sell a game called "Husker-Du," the words "Get It" were flashed
upon the television screen during a sixty second commercial. Id.
72. Adams, supra note 58, at 26.
73. Bliss, supra note 16, at 424 (citing Wash. Post, May 12, 1978, at A13, col. 1). The
message "Contact the Chief" was inserted into a news broadcast of a murder story. Id The
police thought that the murderer might be interested in watching the news and hearing an
account of his deeds. Id This attempt, however, failed. Id
74. W. KEY, supra note 13, at 20.
75. W. KEY, MEDIA SEXPLOrrATION, supra note 28, at 99.
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knowledge, 6 the subliminal messages would appear in the subject's
dreams days, and sometimes weeks, after the initial exposure."
During the late 1950's, market researcher James Vicary, employ-
ing Poetzle's theories, developed the tachistoscope.7 s The tachisto-
scope was essentially a film projector equipped with a high speed
shutter that could flash messages at speeds up to 1/3000 of a second.79
Perhaps the best known experiment using the tachistoscope involved
Vicary's Subliminal Projection Company. 0 During the viewing of the
movie "Picnic," the tachistoscope flashed the messages "Hungry? Eat
Popcorn" and "Drink Coca-Cola" onto the screen."1 Reportedly,
during the six-week test involving 45,699 patrons, popcorn sales
increased 57.7% and Coca-Cola sales rose 18.1%.82 These results
have not been substantiated or duplicated. 3 The tachistoscope tech-
nique has since been incorporated into movies and commercials.8 4
This technique involves splicing several frames of film containing a
subliminal message in between the frames of the movie being shown. 5
When the film is shown at normal speeds, the interspliced scenes
appear so fast that the viewing audience is not consciously aware of
their existence.
Subvisual subliminal messages also can be transmitted by lower-
ing the light intensity of an ordinary projector so that the message is
too dim to be perceived by the conscious eye.8 6 This method may be
more effective than the brief flashing of messages by the tachistoscope
because a message can be transmitted continuously rather than
intermittently. 87
Subaudible subliminal communication is the second prominent
way that subliminal messages are transmitted. These transmissions
are broadcast at either a tonal frequency outside the range of con-
scious human perception or at volumes reduced so that the subject
cannot consciously hear the message.8" Subaudible communications
also have been incorporated in commercial and artistic productions.
76. For a discussion of the Poetzle effect, see N. DIXON, supra note 31, at 91-98.
77. W. KEY, MEDIA SEXPLOITATION, supra note 28, at 99.
78. W. KEY, supra note 13, at 21.
79. CHRJSTIANrrY TODAY, Jan. 31, 1975, at 9.
80. Note, Subconscious Taken Captive, supra note 17, at 1080.
81. Bliss, supra note 16, at 422.
82. W. KEY, supra note 13, at 22-23.
83. Adams, supra note 58, at 30.
84. W. KEY, MEDIA SEXpLorrATION, supra note 28, at 102.
85. Id at 101.
86. W. KEY, supra note 13, at 23.
87. Id
88. Bliss, supra note 16, at 421. The "silent dog whistle" is an example of a sound
imperceptible to human consciousness. W. KEY, supra note 13, at 27. Human beings can hear
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For example, this technique has been employed artistically in mov-
ies8 9 and songs9° either to increase tension or evoke emotion. Addi-
tionally, subaudible messages have been used to sell products,91 to
increase the vigilance of military personnel, 92 to reduce theft,93 to
reduce the rate of error on the factory assembly line,9' and to help
motivate people to do everything from losing weight to quitting
smoking.95
Another technique commonly used to convey subliminal
messages is "embedding." 96 Embedding involves hiding images in
advertisements,97 photographs, or paintings98 that relate to human
need, 99 or insecurities." Theoretically, by appealing to a need or
insecurity, a strong emotional response will be evoked.101 In advertis-
the whistle, but not consciously. Id. "Data transmitted at these high tonal frequencies register
in the unconscious." Id.
89. Bliss, supra note 16, at 424. To heighten tension in the film "The Exorcist," director
William Friedkin used subliminal sounds of an angry swarm of bees, the sound of terrified pigs
being slaughtered, and the sound of orgasmic vocalization. Id (citing W. KEY, MEDIA
SEXPLOITATION, supra note 28, at 111).
90. For a discussion on subliminal lyrics in music, see W. KEY, MEDIA SEXPLOITATION,
supra note 28, at 116-44. Fg., Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989)
(Order Denying Summary Judgment at 10) (referring to lyrics in the song "Better by You,
Better Than Me" on an album by the heavy metal rock group Judas Priest entitled "Stained
Class"); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988)
(referring to subliminal lyrics in the song "Suicide Solution" on the heavy metal rock album by
John 'Ozzy' Osbourne entitled "Blizzard of Oz").
91. Shelly Palmer, a copywriter and singer, admits to having altered the soundwaves of
voice and music tracks in advertisements for Seagram's mixers, Bailey's Casino, and Matilda
Bay wine coolers. Kalish, Creative Concepts, MARKETING & MEDIA DECISIONS, May 1988, at
32. Interestingly, Palmer can evade FCC rules prohibiting certain sounds (i.e. casino noises)
by broadcasting the outlawed sounds subliminally. Id at 31.
92. Note, Judicial Recognition, supra note 17, at 733, 741 (citing HUMAN ENGINEERING
LABORATORIES, ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND, U.S. ARMY, WORK
PERFORMANCE WITH MUSIC: INSTRUMENTATION AND FREQUENCY RESPONSE 20-21 (1968)
(Technical Memorandum 9-68, AMCMS Code 5026.11.81900).
93. One department store reported a savings of $600,000 by reducing theft 37% during a
nine month period. Behavibr: Secret Voices, TIME, Sept. 10, 1979, at 71.
94. Note, Judicial Recognition, supra note 17, at 742.
95. Kiesel, supra note 30, at 27. Potentials Unlimited of Grand Rapids, Michigan,
markets self-help subliminal audio and visual cassettes. Id
96. Technically, this method is not subliminal because the "embeds" can be seen in a
conscious state. Moore, supra note 11, at 10. See generally W. KEY, CLAM PLATE, supra note
28, at 7; W. KEY, MEDIA SEXPLOrrATION, supra note 28, at 102; W. KEY, supra note 13, at
23.
97. One technique involves hiding certain taboo words in the advertisement. W. KEY,
MEDIA SEXPLOITATION, supra note 28, at 9.
98. Id For example, the word "seks," which is the seventeenth century Dutch word for
"sex," can be found in at least one Rembrandt painting. Id. at 10.
99. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
100. Bliss, supra note 16, at 420.
101. Id.
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ing, the advertiser hopes that the unsuspecting subject will uncon-
sciously associate the product with the subject's need or insecurity,
thereby causing the subject to choose the advertised product. 2 The
needs triggering the strongest emotional responses are those needs
associated with sex and death.10 3
III. FREEDOM OF SPEECH: BACKGROUND
A. Justification of Free Speech
The development of free speech in the American colonies fol-
lowed a pattern similar to the development of free speech in Eng-
land.' °' The colonies initially evinced no intent to liberalize free
communication within their own communities. 105 Only powerful
individuals, such as members of the clergy, were able to speak without
fear of being punished. 106 The text of the main body of the Constitu-
tion does not include an express provision upholding a general theory
of free speech. 0 7 Only with the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791,
was freedom of speech protected. 08 Nonetheless, although the gen-
eral public was given the right of free speech, certain types of speech
were vigorously suppressed."° Even today, the boundaries of first
amendment protection remain unclear."10 What is certain, however, is
that the first amendment occupies a preferred position among the
hierarchy of constitutional rights."' Justice Cardozo characterized
speech as a "fundamental liberty," asserting that nearly every other
freedom is made possible by free speech." 2 Three main theories have
been advanced as judicial and philosophical justifications for the spe-
102. Id
103. Id.
104. T. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (1985).
105. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 35, at 714.
106. T. TEDFORD, supra note 104, at 31.
107. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 35, at 715.
108. The first amendment of the Constitution reads as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
109. T. TEDFORD, supra note 104, at 31. Although private libel and obscenity were not
significant concerns in colonial times, blasphemy and sedition were suppressed. Id.
110. Id. at 45.
111. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 18).




cial protection of speech:113 the marketplace of ideas, self government,
and self-development."1 4
No doubt, the most prominent theory supporting the right of free
speech is the "marketplace of ideas."'II The origins of this theory can
be traced back at least to the writings of John Milton in Areopagit-
ica." 6 Milton envisioned truth grappling with falsehoods "in a free
and open encounter."'1 7 Two centuries later, John Stuart Mill reaf-
firmed the ideas of Milton in his classic essay, On Liberty."' Mill
argued that suppression of opinions was wrong whether the opinion
was true or false." 9 Mill contended that "if the opinion was true,
then society would be denied the truth,"1 20 but, even if the opinion
113. Id
114. Other authors and commentators have recognized additional (or different) theories
justifying freedom of expression. Professor Emerson, probably the leading modern theorist of
free speech, has recognized four separate values served by the first amendment's protection of
expression: (1) "assuring individual self-filfillment;" (2) "advancing knowledge and
discovering truth;" (3) "providing for participation in decision making by all members of
society;" and (4) "achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community... [thus]
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."
Reddish, supra note 21, at 591 (citations omitted).
Martin Reddish feels that "the constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves
only one true value. . . 'individual self-realization.'" Id at 593. Reddish contends that other
justifications of free expression are "subvalues" of self-realization. Id at 594.
Professor Blasi, on the other hand, sees the "checking value" of the first amendment as
its primary function. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, AM. B.
FOUND. Ran. J. 521 (1977) (first amendment checks official abuse of power in government).
115. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-1, at 785; see infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
116. T. TEDFORD, supra note 104, at 18. Milton gave four reasons in Areopagitica to
oppose censorship:
(1) It is a tool developed and used by those held in low regard (such as the
opponents of the Reformation); (2) it weakens character (since the study of
various points of view helps to build character); (3) it does not work (the ideas
being censored become known despite efforts to suppress them); and (4) it
discourages learning and the search for truth.
Id (quoting Milton, Areopagitica (1644)). The oft quoted lines from Areopagitica are:
"And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth,
so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to mis-
doubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever know Truth put to
the worse in a free and open encounter?"
Id (quoting Areopagitica).
117. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-1, at 785.
118. Mill reaffirmed the ideas of John Milton. Mill gave three reasons why freedom of
speech was justified: (1) The censored opinion may be true and the accepted opinion may in
error; (2) even truth needs to be challenged and tested, else it becomes a "dead dogma"; and
(3) there is probably some degree of truth in all opinions. T. TEDFORD, supra note 104, at 18.
The most famous lines from On Liberty are: "if all mankind minus one, were of one opinion,
and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind." Id (citing Mill, On Liberty).
119. G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 978.
120. Id
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"is false, society is denied the fuller understanding of truth which
comes from its conflict with error; and when the received opinion is
part truth and part error, society can know the whole truth only by
allowing the airing of competing views." 121
The free market theory was first enunciated in American case-
law by Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States,122 one of his much
celebrated dissents. In Abrams, Holmes stated that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market."'' 23 Under his theory, the law should be used to
expand communications in the "marketplace" and insure that it
remains open. 124 As long as it is open 125 to the widest range of infor-
mation, individuals, and not the censoring authorities, will be the best
judges of their own interests. 26 If ideas are to be encouraged, neither
the government nor private individuals should be allowed to censor
ideas. Thus, under this theory, subliminal transmission should not be
disallowed because at least some individuals would be restricted from
entering the "marketplace." On the other hand, it is arguable that
subliminal communications do not contribute to the exchange of ideas
in dialogue-the purpose of an open marketplace-because they are
not consciously perceived.' 27
The second rationale for the protection of free speech is that the
ability to speak without restraint is "essential to intelligent self-gov-
ernment in a democratic society."' 28  This theory supports absolute
121. Id
122. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. Subsequent cases have affirmed this theory. Cf Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.").
124. T. TEDFORD, supra note 104, at 434.
125. It has been suggested by a number of commentators that the "marketplace" metaphor
does not fit the realities of modem society. G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 979 n. 13. Jerome
A. Barron believes that the open marketplace was just a romantic illusion and if it ever existed,
it surely does not exist today. T. TEDFORD, supra note 104, at 416. Further, the "market" is a
closed system with the channels of communication largely in the hands of private individuals.
Id.; see Barron, Access to the Press--A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641
(1967).
126. T. TEDFORD, supra note 104, at 434.
127. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 25).
128. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-1, at 786.
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protection of the first amendment to "public discussion of issues of
civic importance,"' 29 but offers only minimal protection to other areas
of speech. 130 Critics of this theory have responded by pointing out
that there is no proof that the framers intended to fully protect some
forms of speech and not others. 131 Further, such a distinction is
unworkable as the boundary between public and private speech is not
distinct and often overlaps.' 32 This theory is seen by some as expand-
able to encompass novels, plays, poems, works of art, and commercial
information if they add to the "sophistication and wisdom of the elec-
torate."1 33 Arguably, the potential expansiveness of this theory could
include subliminal communication which at times is coexistent with
supraliminal communication. 34
Perhaps the strongest argument for finding that subliminal
speech is protected under the first amendment lies in the rationale
that free speech adds to and protects the "values of individual liberty,
autonomy and self-development."'' 3  Subliminal transmissions, quite
possibly, may be the only practical way for individuals to communi-
cate certain ideas, feelings, and emotions. 36 By allowing an individ-
ual to freely choose the way to convey an idea, the "individual
develops his powers and abilities to make decisions regarding his
destiny," thus enabling the individual to define and express the
129. Id.; see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); cf Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 259 (1931).
130. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-1, at 786.
131. T. TEDFORD, supra note 104, at 429; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209 (1976) ("But our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social,
artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters ... is not entitled to full First Amendment
protection.").
132. T. TEDPORD, supra note 104, at 429. For example:
[he issue of the censorship of certain controversial novels, such as Strange
Fruit (which deals with the matter of race relations), is considered by many to be
a matter of private speech that can be censored under due process of law; yet
Strange Fruit, as well as many other novels that might be mentioned, also
discusses important social issues. Similarly, publications about birth control are
concerned with both private and public matters. Where does one draw the line?
Id Using an example found in Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899 (1949).
133. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-1, at 787.
134. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) ("[Mluch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well.").
135. G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 979. This theme is also seen in Justice Brandeis'
concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
136. For example, subliminal communication may be the only way artists, singers, or movie
directors can communicate certain feelings. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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"self." '137
B. First Amendment Claims
The United States Supreme Court has allowed the government to
abridge speech in two ways. 138 First, speech can be regulated because
of the ideas or information conveyed.' 39 These types of restrictions
try to limit specific messages or viewpoints"4° or try to prevent the
effects caused by exposure to certain ideas or information.' 4' The sec-
ond way speech is restricted is not by aiming at the ideas or informa-
tion conveyed but by limiting certain types of activities' 42 or by
enforcing rules which discourage communication. 1'4 3 The first type of
restrictions are content-based while the second type are content-
neutral. 144
Content-based restrictions strike at the heart of the first amend-
ment. 45  Regulations that are content-based will survive constitu-
tional scrutiny if the speech that is restricted poses a "clear and
present danger" or otherwise falls into one of the narrowly drawn
classes of speech excepted from the first amendment.'" If the regula-
tion is content-neutral, the Court will balance the values of freedom of
expression against the competing governmental interests that the reg-
ulation is thought to promote. 47 These regulations will pass constitu-
tional muster if the regulation serves a valid governmental interest
and does not unduly restrict the flow of information. 141
Subliminal transmission is a unique mode of communication that
does not fit neatly into any category of restricted speech. The content
of many subliminal messages would be constitutionally protected if
the messages were presented overtly. Thus, a restriction on sublimi-
137. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 24); see also Reddish, supra note 21, at 591-95.
138. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-2, at 789.
139. Id
140. Id ; see, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
141. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-2, at 789; see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
142. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-2, at 789; see, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
143. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-2, at 790; see, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
144. See G. STONE, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 939, 1169 (1986).
145. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-2, at 790. "For if the constitution means anything, it
means that ordinarily at least, 'the government has no power to restrict expression because of
its messages, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.'" Id. (quoting Police Department of
City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
146. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-2, at 791-92.




nal messages would not be content-based. However, the pervasive-
ness of subliminal communication in many forms of speech would
prevent restrictions from being based solely on form. The balance
that would be required to determine which speech would be prohib-
ited must involve the weighing of the right of the speaker to commu-
nicate freely against the privacy and personal autonomy rights of the
recipient of subliminal messages. This balancing can become a slip-
pery slope, "reliant on the sympathetic administration of the law."' 49
C. Commercial Speech
The incorporation of psychological theories in advertising has
long been controversial.' 50 While commercial advertisements are
entitled to qualified first amendment protection,'' advertisers must
nevertheless comply with numerous governmental regulations
whether or not psychological methods are used in commercial speech.
1. THE MEDIUM IS THE SUBLIMINAL MESSAGE
As early as the seventeenth century, merchants utilized the
power of emotions to sell products. 5 2 In the 1950's and early 1960's,
Madison Avenue discovered "motivation research"' 53 and began
experimenting with Freudian-psychological techniques in advertis-
ing. ' 4 Today, advertisements go far beyond communicating the price
149. Id at 794 ("The balancing approach is... a slippery slope; once an issue is seen as a
matter of degree, first amendment protections become especially reliant on the sympathetic
administration of the law."). Additionally, it may be hard, if not impossible, to accurately
determine the "true" effect, if any, that the subliminal communication has on the recipient.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
150. See generally V. PACKARD, supra note 62.
151. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text; see also Gurnick, supra note 17, at 59.
152. Reed & Coalson, Eighteenth-Century Legal Doctrine Meets Twentieth-Century
Marketing Techniques F.T. C Regulation of Emotionally Conditioning Advertising, 11 GA. L.
REv. 733, 735-36 (1977).
153. Motivation research has been described as follows:
Motivation research is the type of research that seeks to learn what
motivates people in making choices. It employs techniques designed to reach the
unconscious or subconscious mind because preferences generally are determined
by factors of which the individual is not conscious.... Actually in the buying
situation the consumer generally acts emotionally and compulsively,
unconsciously reacting to the images and designs which in the subconscious are
associated with the product.
V. PACKARD, supra note 62, at 7-8 (quoting Louis Cheskin, Market Researcher).
Subliminal techniques have been used for decades. This caused Marshall McLuhan to
comment "that 1984 really happened around 1930, but we didn't notice." W. KEY, MEDIA
SEXPLOrrATION, supra note 28, at 74. McLuhan was referring to the "general effect of sub-
liminal media upon western society." Id.
154. Reed & Coalson, supra note 152, at 743.
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and/or the physical attributes of the advertised product.1"' Clever
advertising executives appeal to a consumer's emotional or psycholog-
ical needs and seem to promise, either explicitly or implicitly, that
their product will fill these needs. 156 By grouping potential consumers
according to their "psychographic" profiles, 1 advertisers can aim a
product toward an emotional need of a particular segment of the pop-
ulation to achieve maximum advertising effectiveness.' 58 Sophisticated
advertising techniques employ emotional symbols that consumers
associate with products in order to enhance sales. 59 Advertisers use a
myriad of nonverbal techniques, such as music, graphics, and drama,
to tap into consumers' emotions."e° The concentration seems to be on
process rather than on substance. 16 1
Advertisers teach consumers, through classical nonverbal condi-
tioning techniques, to associate emotional symbols with advertised
155. Id. at 734.
156. Id. Abraham Maslow's theory of the "hierarchy of needs" describes human needs as
primary and secondary. The primary needs include safety, food, and shelter; the secondary
needs encompass belongingness, love, self-esteem, status, and self-actualization. Id. at 740; see
also A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 80-92 (1954).
Aldous Huxley succinctly stated the method of using subliminal techniques to encourage
sales:
Find some common desire, some widespread unconscious fear or anxiety;
think out some way to relate this wish or fear to the product you have to sell;
then build a bridge of verbal or pictorial symbols over which your customer can
pass from fact to compensatory dream, and from the dream to the illusion that
your product, when purchased, will make the dream come true.
A. HUXLEY, supra note 1, at 51.
Vance Packard identified eight hidden needs that, if effectively related to a product, would
cause consumers to purchase the product in order to satisfy a hidden need. The eight hidden
needs Packard identified are: emotional security, reassurance of worth, ego gratification, crea-
tivity, love objects, power, a sense of roots, and immortality. V. PACKARD, supra note 62, at
72-83.
157. Reed & Coalson, supra note 152, at 743. "In the late 1960's the word psychographics
began appearing .... [It referred] to the techniques involved with a sophisticated relationship
between psychology and marketing research.... [I]t became possible to categorize consumers
by statistical regressions into psychological groupings." Id (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 744.
"[P]eople don't seem to be reasonable .... But people do act with purpose. Their
behavior makes sense if you think about it in terms of its goals, of people's needs and their
motives. That seems to be the secret of understanding or manipulating people." V. PACKARD,
supra note 62, at 19.
159. Reed & Coalson, supra note 152, at 739.
160. Reed & Whitman, supra note 17, at 276-78.
161. M. McLUHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 10 (1967). Media
influences almost every aspect of our lives. "All media work us over completely. They are so
pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and
social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The
medium is the message." Id. at 26.
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products.1 62 Through conditioned responses, advertisers try to alter
consumers' feelings about products.1 63 By changing the consumers'
feelings, it is hoped that, eventually, the emotional conditioning will
change the way consumers think about products.1" "[T]he resulting
belief-change occurs not because of a rational, reasoned process but
due to an affective, conditioned one."'' 65 By using nonverbal tech-
niques, advertisers communicate that their product will give "emo-
tional satisfactions, which are extrinsic to the products and services
yet which motivate" sales.' 66 Inducement of "consumer preferences
apart from any intrinsic product or service characteristics"1 67 has led
to charges that emotionally laden nonverbal advertising is deceptive
and should be restricted.1 68
2. RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING
Prior to the mid-1970's, commercial advertising, or speech whose
primary purpose was commercial, was thought not to be protected by
the first amendment.1 69 However, in 1976, when Virginia State Board
162. Reed & Coalson, supra note 152, at 745-51.
The classical conditioning paradigm states briefly that where one stimulus,
called the "unconditioned stimulus," which evokes a certain "response," is
paired repetitively with an unrelated second stimulus, called the "conditioned
stimulus," the "conditioned stimulus" alone will, after a time, evoke the
"response" previously elicited only by the "unconditioned stimulus." Thus,
Pavlov, who formulated this paradigm, was able to teach a dog to salivate
(response) upon hearing a buzzer (conditioned stimulus) by repetitively
associating the buzzer's sound with the presentation of food (unconditioned
stimulus).
Id at 745 n.54 (citing Stolurow, Conditioning, in HANDBOOK OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY
283-84 (B. Wolman ed. 1973)).
163. Id at 746.
164. Id By appealing to one's emotions, advertisers try to change the way a person
subconsciously feels about a product. This is believed to be more effective than appealing to
one's powers of logic or reason to attempt to change what a person consciously thinks or
believes about a product. Id.
165. Id
166. Reed & Whitman, supra note 17, at 285.
167. Id at 286.
168. See id.; see also Reed & Coalson, supra note 152, at 733.
169. G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 1128-29; see, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942) (sustaining a ban on handbill advertisements). In Chrestensen, the Court established
the commercial speech doctrine:
This Court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion
and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its
employment in the public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on governments as respects purely
commercial advertising.
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of Pharmacy'v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 170 was
decided, the law began to shift in favor of protecting commercial
speech. 17 1 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, a group of consum-
ers, concerned about the high price of prescription drugs, challenged a
Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising pre-
scription drug prices.1 72 In striking down the state statute, the United
States Supreme Court held that commercial speech was protected by
the first amendment.' 73 The Court, however, qualified its holding by
adding that speech that "no more than propose[s] a commercial pur-
pose" is distinguishable from other varieties of speech and, thus, is
entitled to a lesser degree of protection.' 7 4
Three years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission,'7 - the Court established a four-part test to
determine whether regulations restricting commercial speech are
valid under the first amendment. 76 In fashioning its test, the Court
stressed that first amendment protection of commercial speech is
"based on the informational function of advertising.' ' 7 7  Conse-
quently, any advertising which misinforms or is deceptive may be sup-
pressed.' 78  Citing the Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Central
Id. at 54. The Chresiensen case has been severely criticized and has even caused Justice Doug-
las to refer to the decision as "casual, almost offhand." G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 1128.
170. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
171. Reed & Whitman, supra note 17, at 292.
172. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 749.50 (1976).
173. Id at 770.
174. Id. at 771-72 n.24. In qualifying the protection of commercial speech, the Court said:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are
common sense differences between speech that does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction," and other varieties. Even if the differences do not
justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to
complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different
degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired .... Also, commercial speech may be
more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of
commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and forgone entirely.
Id
175. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
176. Id at 566. The four-part analysis the Court devised was: 1) the Court must
"determine whether the expression [is] protected by the First Amendment" (for commercial
speech, at a minimum, it must not mislead and it must concern a lawful activity); 2) the Court
must determine whether the "asserted governmental interest is substantial;" 3) if the answers
to the previous questions are positive, the Court must then determine if the asserted
governmental interest is directly advanced by the regulation; and 4) whether the regulation is
more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted interest. Id.
177. Id. at 563.
178. Id
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Hudson line of cases, some commentators have suggested that because
nonverbal communicative techniques-presumably including sublimi-
nal techniques--either mislead or deceive the public, the government
and the FTC may constitutionally "protect consumers from 'unfair'
emotionally conditioning commercial messages."179
Although persuasive arguments exist for the prohibition of sub-
liminal advertising, it does not follow that all subliminal communica-
tions, including those used in artistic expressions, should be
prohibited. Subliminal advertising is distinguishable from subliminal
artistic expression in several respects.180 First, commercial speech,
such as advertising, historically has been subject to substantial gov-
ernmental regulation,181 while artistic expression generally has been
accorded great deference.'82 Currently, for example, there are FTC
and NAB regulations that restrict subliminal broadcasting on televi-
sion' 83 while, with respect to artistic expression, network censors have
become more lenient with what they will permit to be aired. Second,
the constitutional values of individual liberty, autonomy, and self-
development are heightened when the profit motive is diminished. If
artistic uses of subliminal expression were disallowed, artistic freedom
would be reduced. Contrarily, the profit incentive acts as a counter-
vailing force to restrictions on commercial advertising. If a certain
form of advertising is disallowed, other forms will quickly fill the void
so that sales will not be adversely affected. Thus, eliminating sublimi-
nal advertising would have little, if any, effect on the overall volume
of commercial advertising.114
The same countervailing force, however, does not apply in artis-
tic expression. Whereas advertisers use subliminal techniques to trig-
179. Reed & Coalson, supra note 152, at 782. See generally Reed & Whitman, supra note
17.
180. Along this line, one commentator wrote:
To consider legal implications of subliminal advertising, commercial and
subliminal expression must be distinguished from that which lies outside these
categories. Commercial speech is easily distinguished from other expression.
The former "is confined to the promotion of specific goods or services." It does
"no more than promote a commercial transaction." Commercial speech is
characterized by the advertiser's purely economic interests. Non-commercial
speech involves "exposition of ideas ... truth, science, morality and arts."
Gurnick, supra note 17, at 60-61 (footnotes and citations omitted).
181. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 767
(1978).
182. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 73 (1976).
183. See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
184. "[Clommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds" of speech. Therefore,
"there is little likelihood of it ... being chilled by proper regulation." Virginia Pharmacy Bd.
v. Virginia Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
1990] 1265
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1243
ger feelings in consumers that they hope impel them to purchase
products, artists employ subliminal techniques to trigger feelings and
emotions that are ends in themselves. 8 While it might be true that
there is no such thing as "pure" commercial speech, 116 it is obvious
that because increased sales is its primary goal, commercial speech
has primarily a pecuniary motivation. Viewed from this perspective,
one could fairly conclude that subliminal advertising is more decep-
tive and manipulative than art forms embodying subliminal tech-
niques because subliminal advertising uses one's emotions as tools to
achieve another objective: sales. Thus, while it might be unclear
whether subliminal advertising is entitled to the "qualified, but none-
theless substantial protection accorded to commercial speech,"' 87 it is
clear that subliminal artistic expression deserves greater protection
than commercial speech in general.
D. The Regulation of Subliminal Speech
Both the Congress and the state legislatures have considered
passing laws regulating subliminal communications. To date, no law
restricting subliminal transmissions has ever been passed by Congress.
The only restrictions that exist are to be found in rules of regulatory
agencies and in policy statements issued by television networks and
their supervisory affiliates.
1. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Federal attempts to regulate subliminal communications have
been unsuccessful. For example, in 1958, Representatives Jim Wright
and Craig Hosmer introduced bills that would penalize the unlawful
use of subliminal advertising on television.' 88 Hearings were never
held on the bill.'8 9 A year later, Wright reintroduced the bill. Once
185. See Reed & Whitman, supra note 17, at 276. "A primary purpose of music is to trigger
emotion. Listeners often 'consume' musical emotion purely for private enjoyment." Id
Further, artistic expression may be ideally suited for subliminal techniques. One author stated
that:
In many of these realms communicators aim to evoke emotional response
from those who attend their work. Art, for example, does not necessarily call for
cognitive or articulable reaction. Subliminal techniques are consistent with such
forms of expression. The techniques constitute a valuable tool among
communicators' choice of methods with which to express themselves and affect
audiences.
Gurnick, supra note 17, at 59-60.
186. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 181, at 772.
187. Bolger v. Young Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983).
188. Bliss, supra note 16, at 426.
189. Id
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again, it died in committee.' 90
State legislatures have also attempted to pass bills restricting sub-
liminal transmissions. For example, in 1984, the California Assem-
bly, considered a bill restricting the transmission of subliminal
messages. 91 This bill, unlike the federal bills, was not only aimed at
advertisers, but also restricted any "person who knowingly communi-
cates to members of the public any subliminally embedded communi-
cation" without making known the existence of such
communication. 92 Because the bill was never acted on by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, it too died in committee. 93 Thus far, no regu-
lation, either state or federal, has ever been passed that restricts subli-
minally transmitted messages.' 94
2. THE POSITION OF THE FTC, THE FCC, AND THE NAB
As early as 1957, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) addressed the issue of subliminal transmissions. 195 It indicated
that subliminal broadcasting "is inconsistent with.., the public inter-
est."' 96  Under Section 303 of the Communication Act,197 the FCC
may have the ability to control certain subliminal messages.' 98 But,
this statutory authority is limited to enforcement against broadcast-
190. Ia
191. Gurnick, supra note 17, at 70.
192. Id. Gurnick, the bill's author, expressed some skepticism as to whether the California
Bill was the best way to deal with subliminal advertising. Id He wrote:
To the extent that the proposal dealt with other realms of communication it
might or might not be appropriate. For the realm of advertising there is a better
method of regulating subliminal communication. The Federal Trade
Commission or State counterparts offer expertise in studying subliminal
techniques, consistency in regulating them, and flexibility in remedying abuses.
Id
193. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 16).
194. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 37, Vance v. Judas Priest (D. Nev.
1989) (No. 86-5844/86-3939). It may be impossible to draft a statute containing a first
amendment exception for subliminal communications that would pass constitutional muster.
Id.
195. FCC Public Notice, FCC 57-1289 (Nov. 27, 1957). For a discussion of the FCC notice,
see Bliss, supra note 16, at 429-32.
196. FCC Public Notice, FCC 74-78 (Jan. 24, 1974) ("We believe that use of subliminal
perception is inconsistent with the obligations of a licensee, and therefore we take this occasion
to make clear that broadcasts employing such techniques are contrary to the public interest.
Whether effective or not such broadcasts are intended to be deceptive.").
197. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
198. Bliss, supra note 16, at 429; see also Richards & Zakia, Pictures: An Advertiser's
Expressway Through FTC Regulation, 16 GA. L. REv. 77, 83-94 (1981) (discussing the FCC
restrictions on advertisers).
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ers199 and sanctions may be imposed only if the broadcaster has
knowledge of the subliminal message.2 "° The FCC cannot take action
against the advertiser; that responsibility rests with the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).2°0 However, the FTC is similarly limited in its
authority. It may act against an advertiser only if the subliminal
message constitutes unfair competition or a deceptive practice202 as
those terms have been defined by the FTC and the courts, mainly
through case law.203
Perhaps the strongest restrictions on subliminal transmissions
have been established by the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB). The NAB is the broadcast industry's self-regulating body
and has never favored broadcasting subliminal messages.2 "4 Starting
in 1958, the NAB Television Code expressly rejected the use of any
transmission of information made below the threshold of conscious
perception.20 All the major networks have followed the NAB's lead
and refuse to transmit subliminal messages. 2°6 Finally, to insure that
199. Bliss, supra note 16, at 430. Enforcement against broadcasters is difficult. Id First,
47 U.S.C. § 317 "applies only to messages received from undisclosed sources." Id Thus,
without proper disclosure, broadcasters are prohibited from inserting subliminal ads of one
advertiser into ads of other advertisers, or into news or entertainment broadcasts. Id.
However, broadcasters are not prohibited from running overt ads containing the same
subliminal message. Id Second, Section 317 does not prohibit the inclusion of subliminal ads
in unsponsored or public service announcements. Id Finally, the FCC is without statutory
authority to enforce sanctions against advertising agencies and program producers. Id at 431.
200. Id at 430-31.
201. Id. at 432; see also Richards & Zakia, supra note 198, at 83-86.
202. Bliss, supra note 16, at 432. "[U]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. (quoting
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980); see also
Scientific Mfg. v. FTC, 24 F.2d 640, 644 (3d Cir. 1941) (holding that the FTC could prevent
unfair or deceptive acts or practices).
203. Richards & Zakia, supra note 198, at 88 (citing cases which define deception: Heinz
W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963) (defining misrepresentation of fact); Blockenstette v.
FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943) (deceptive advertising may occur if advertisement is
susceptible to misreading); P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950) (deception
occurs when evidence is taken out of context so as to distort the truth)). For an analysis of
unfairness, see Reed & Coalson, supra note 152, at 762-64.
204. Bliss, supra note 16, at 434.
205. Id at 435. The NAB's last statement on its policy with respect to subliminal
communication stated: "Subliminal Perception. Any technique whereby an attempt is made
to convey information to viewer by transmitting messages below the threshold of normal
awareness is not permitted." Id (quoting NAB, THE TELEVISION CODE, Program Standards,
ch. 4, 12 (20th ed. June 1978)).
206. Id 436-37. In 1957, ABC announced:
Until such time as full and complete information concerning the effect of
this technique is available for careful consideration, the ABC Television Network
and its owned and operated stations, in keeping with the policy that all
commercial announcements should be clearly identified as such, will not
broadcast messages utilizing, the technique of subliminal perception.
1268
SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION
no subliminal messages can be found in advertisements for alcohol,
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has adopted a regula-
tion prohibiting such advertising2' on the basis that it constitutes a
deceptive advertising practice. 08
The main goal behind most of the mentioned regulations is to
curb subliminal communications only with respect to advertising.' 9
But, advertising is just one of many areas in which subliminal tech-
niques may be employed. For example, subliminal messages occur in
art, music, and movies to evoke emotional responses from those
attending the artists' work.210 Interestingly, even advocates of remov-
ing subliminal messages from advertising admit that subliminal tech-
niques can be a valuable tool for communicators to use to "express
themselves and [to] affect [their] audiences. ' 211
IV. ARTISTIC SUBLIMINAL EXPRESSION FINDS PROTECTION
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
An analysis of whether a particular form of expression, conduct,
or speech is protected by the first amendment must begin with the
threshold question of whether the suspect activity can be defined as
"speech." Speech, "as an irreducible minimum... must constitute a
communication. ' 212 Communication, in turn, requires that there be a
communicator and a recipient.213 Subliminal communication would
certainly fit within this simplistic definition of speech because there is
a communicator attempting to communicate a message, albeit a sub-
liminal message, to a potential listener.
Next, the question of whether subliminal communication, in the
form of artistic expression, constitutes speech should be answered in
the affirmative. "[F]reedom of speech is not limited to political
Id. (quoting 6 NARTB, TELEVISION CODE SUBSCRIBER BULLETIN, No. 8, at 1 (Dec. 1975)).
207. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 17). The regulation states:
(h) Deceptive advertising techniques. Subliminal or similar techniques are
prohibited. "Subliminal or similar techniques," as used in this part, refers to any
device or technique that is used to convey, or attempts to convey, a message to a
person by means of images or sounds of a very brief nature that cannot be
perceived.at a normal level of awareness.
Id. (quoting 27 C.F.R. § 5.65(h) (1988)).
208. Id.
209. See generally Bliss, supra note 16.
210. Gurnick, supra note 17, at 56, 58-59.
211. Id.
212. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L.
REv. 29, 36 (1973).
213. Id.
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expression or comment on public affairs."2 4 "Speech," for first
amendment purposes, is defined by "the idea of cognitive content, of
mental effect, of a communication designed to appeal to the intellec-
tual process. This... [includes] the artistic and the emotive as well as
the propositional .... [It is] essentially... a mental stimulus."2 5 By
adding a subliminal element to artistic expression, the emotive con-
tent of the expression is enhanced. The United States Supreme Court
has held that "[iun this Nation every writer, actor, or producer, no
matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from
the censor.121 6 Thus, if his medium of expression includes subliminal
communication, that expression should be included within the ambit
of constitutional protection.
Further, art forms cannot be dissected into speech components
that are allowable and those that are not.21 Often, it is precisely the
nonverbal element that helps to define and distinguish the specific
forms of art and artistic expression. 26 This is because humans cannot
convey ideas.219 "People can convey only signs, sounds, and symbols
that represent... idea[s] to them. ' 220 Because artistic expressions are
not as constrained or as clear as the spoken or written word-exem-
plified by the fact that a particular piece of art work can, and often
does, have different meanings for different people-the artist should
be allowed the greatest latitude to use whatever means is necessary
fully to express himself. A central concern of the first amendment is
that there "be a free flow from creator to audience of whatever
message . . .might [be] convey[ed]. ' 221 Moreover, "the free speech
guarantee is that there be full opportunity for expression in all its
varied forms to convey a desired message. "222 As the Court recog-
nized in Cohen v. California,223 "linguistic expression serves a dual
214. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 493, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888,
892 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)).
215. Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity" An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922-23 (1979).
216. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 73, 77 (1976) (quoting Douglas J.,
concurring in Superior Films v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954)).
217. Southeastern Promotions v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634, 639 (1971).
218. Id.
219. Cleveland, Semiotic" Determining What the Advertising Message Means to the
Audience, in 3 ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 227 (3. Olson & K. Sentis eds.
1986).
220. Id.
221. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 73, 77 (1976).
222. Id. at 76.
223. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the defendant wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck
the Draft" in the Los Angeles County Courthouse. Id at 16. The Court reversed a conviction
that Cohen maliciously and willfully disturbed the peace by offensive conduct. Id. at 16, 26.
1270
SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of rela-
tively precise detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emo-
tions as well."224 Thus,
[E]ven if a communication is substantially devoid of all cogni-
tive content, its emotive content is surely protectable. It would be
shocking to conclude that symphonic compositions or
nonrepresentational art could be the subject of governmental cen-
sorship. Both are fully within the ambit of the first amendment
notwithstanding their lack of both verbal and cognitive content. 225
Although several cases tangentially have discussed subliminal
communication, none have dealt squarely with the issue of whether
subliminal speech is to be accorded first amendment protection. 26 As
the following two cases will illustrate, however, first amendment prin-
ciples require that subliminal speech be protected under the first
amendment unless it falls into one of the pre-existing categories of
speech that may be limited.
For example, in Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System,227 a
Florida federal district court refused to place liability on television
broadcasters where a susceptible minor viewed violence and then
acted unlawfully. In Zamora, the plaintiff alleged that he had become
"involuntarily addicted to and completely subliminally intoxicated"
by viewing extensive broadcasts of violence by the three major televi-
sion networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC.228 Zamora claimed that the
networks breached their duty to him by failing to use ordinary care in
preventing impermissible stimulation, incitement, and instigation to
duplicate the violent acts he witnessed on television. 229 The district
court correctly dismissed the case for failing to state a claim.23°
In reaching its decision, the Zamora court noted that the broad-
casts of violence did not fit into any of the established categories of
224. Id. at 26.
225. Nimmer, supra note 212, at 35.
226. See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pub., Inc. 687 F.2d 563, 570-71 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding that adoption of the name "Playmen" in a magazine subtitle subliminally
infringed upon the "Playboy" mark); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(In analyzing the FCC's authority to regulate cigarette commercials, Judge Bazelon noted that
"it is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of [the] pervasive propaganda [of
commercials], which may be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought
greater than the impact of the written word."); Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F.
Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (court refused to hold television networks liable for minor's
violent acts although defendant claimed that he had become subliminally intoxicated by the
extensive violence he viewed on television).
227. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 204.
228. Id. at 200.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 201.
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speech that may be limited,231 such as speech that was obscene, pro-
fane, libelous, or insulting. The court refused to recognize a new duty
standard that would allow recovery when a susceptible person views
violent acts and subsequently behaves unlawfully.232 The court also
noted that the aberrant acts of a few sensitive or insensitive individu-
als should not inhibit broadcasters' rights to disseminate.233
Next, in McCollum v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,234 a case
factually similar to Vance v. Judas Priest, a California appellate court
refused to hold record producers liable for a listener's suicide because
there was no evidence that subliminal music lyrics were intended to or
did bring about the suicide.23 In McCollum, plaintiff's son commit-
ted suicide after listening to albums by John 'Ozzy' Osbourne contain-
ing songs suggesting that suicide was an acceptable alternative to
life.236 McCollum sued alleging that the music was the proximate
cause of his son's suicide.237 While the album arguably contained sub-
liminal lyrics advocating suicide,238 the question of whether sublimi-
nal communication was protected by the first amendment was not
placed directly before the court. The court stated that although the
lyrics were not immediately intelligible, they were "perceptible
[enough] to be heard and understood when the listener concentrate[d]
on the music and lyrics. ' 239 In holding that Osbourne was not liable,
231. Id at 204. The court also stated that "any action, legislative or otherwise which has as
its purpose placing limitations upon freedom of expression must be viewed with suspicion."
Id. at 203.
232. Id at 206. The court stated that "the imposition of such a generally undefined and
undefinable duty would be an unconstitutional exercise by this Court." Id In addition, the
court recognized that it lacked both the legal and institutional capacity to identify depictions
of violence, let alone the ability to define standards for media dissemination of items containing
violence. Id. at 203. If such a standard was adopted, a broadcaster might be liable for acts
committed by viewers after watching such broadcasts as Julius Caesar, Hamlet, Grimm's Fairy
Tales, All Quiet on the Western Front, The Holocaust, and John Wayne movies. Id at 206.
[T]he imposition of the duty claimed would discriminate among television
productions on the basis of content and not on the basis of any of the first
amendment limitations referred to above. The works of creative artists and
entertainers must be protected. The First Amendment casts a "heavy burden"
on those who seek to censor.
Id (citations omitted).
233. Id at 205.
234. 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988).
235. Id. at 1000, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
236. Id. at 995, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
237. Id. at 994, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
238. The song "Suicide Solution" contains masked lyrics which are sung at one and one-
half times the normal rate of speed. Id. at 997, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
239. Id The lyrics are as follows:
"Ah know people




the court stated that "[m]erely because art may evoke a mood of
depression as it figuratively depicts the darker side of human nature
does not mean that it constitutes a direct incitement to commit
violence. ' 2 °
These two cases illustrate several first amendment principles.
First, courts are hesitant to recognize new categories of restricted
speech. As the Zamora court pointed out, "any action, legislative or
otherwise which has as its purpose placing limitations upon freedom
of expression must be viewed with suspicion. ' 241  Second, aberrant
behavior by a small group of individuals in reaction to certain types of
expression does not necessarily require that barriers be enacted
prohibiting the particular form of speech2 42 Third, to justify suppres-
sion of speech, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the
danger to be prevented is imminent.243 Fourth, prohibition of free
speech is an "inappropriate means for averting a relatively trivial
harm to society."' 2 " Finally, in our system, "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right of
free expression. '"2" Thus, if the subliminal message does not fall into
one of the pre-existing categories of restricted speech, a court should
be hesitant to invent a new category. Instead, it should apply the
general rule that a governmental body may not restrict either the
form or content of individual expression.24s
A. Regulating Speech
1. CONTENT REGULATION
Certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, fall
Why try, why try
Get the gun and try it
Shoot, shoot, shoot" (this line was repeated for about ten seconds).
Id.
240. Id at 1001, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
241. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
242. " here may be some persons about with such lawless and violent proclivities, but that
is an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional values, a
governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding
particular forms of expression." Id at 205 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23
(1971)).
243. See McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 1000-03, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193-95
(Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the incitement standard established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969), had not been met); see infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
244. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring)
("Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be
inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society.").
245. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 204 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
246. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
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outside the scope of constitutional protection.247 Consequently, if a
subliminal communication should fall into one of the relatively few
unprotected categories of speech, it too would not receive first amend-
ment protection.248 Subliminal speech, however, unlike obscenity,
does not naturally lend itself to categorizations.
More fundamentally, the question is whether subliminal
messages could ever pose a "clear and present danger" by inciting
imminent lawless action. If so, then subliminal speech might be for-
bidden.249 In Judas Priest, the plaintiffs alleged that the subliminal
message contained in musical lyrics posed a clear and present danger
because it caused the suicide of Belknap and the attempted suicide of
Vance.25° Had the message on the Judas Priest album been overt it
would likely be protected speech unless, of course, it fell into an
unprotected category. 25' The plaintiffs, however, questioned whether
the same message, presented subliminally, would still be protected if it
met the standard established in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 252 Brandenburg
prohibits speech that "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. '2 53
Presumedly, plaintiffs' argument in Judas Priest is that the message is
not protected by the first amendment because it unconsciously incited
the decedents to commit suicide.
247. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
248. Id
249. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (Constitutional
guarantees of free speech do not permit a state to restrict activities unless those activities are
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.").
250. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Vance v. Judas Priest (D. Nev.
1989) (No. 86-5844/86-3939).
251. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D. Nev. 1989) (Order Denying Summary
Judgment at 19); see McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 998, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187,
191 (Ct. App. 1988) (lyrics are protected speech); see also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that publisher was not liable for death of
adolescent who hanged himself after he read an article in the magazine entitled "Orgasm of
Death" discussing the practice of autoerotic asphyxia: "masturbating while 'hanging' oneself
in order to temporarily cut off blood supply to the brain at the moment of orgasm");
Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 404 Mass. 624, 626-27, 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1068-69
(1989) (holding that motion picture producer and distributor was not liable for the death of a
minor who was killed by a group of teenagers after they viewed a violent movie about gangs).
For related discussions on the liability of television and movie producers, see Note, Media
Liability for Injuries that Result from Television Broadcasts to Immature Audiences, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 377 (1985); and Note, Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Statementw" First
Amendment Considerations, 93 YALE L.J. 744 (1984).
252. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing a Ku Klux Klan leader's conviction





In McCollum, a similar case involving both overt and subliminal
lyrics suggesting that suicide is an acceptable and desirable alternative
to life, the California appellate court set forth the necessary showing
to go forward under the incitement standard. It explained that "the
court must be satisfied that the speech (1) was directed or intended
toward the goal of producing imminent lawless conduct and (2) was
likely to produce such imminent conduct. Speech directed to action
at some indefinite time in the- future will not satisfy this test."254 On
the facts presented, the McCollum court held that there was no com-
mand2" to immediately commit suicide and there was no intent by
the singer that the decedent kill himself.25 6 The court also noted the
difficulty in applying the incitement standard to musical lyrics and
poetry because such expressions are figurative and no rational person
could believe that the lyrics or poetry are literal commands for imme-
diate action.2 57  Similarly, because subliminal lyrics may at best,
through repeated exposure, modify some future behavior, they could
not meet the immediate action qualification set forth in Brandenburg.
Based on the tests expounded in Brandenburg and McCollum, the
restrictive holding in Judas Priest that subliminal speech could be pro-
hibited was incorrect and poses a serious threat to freedom of
expression.
In summary, subliminal speech cannot be regulated because of
content alone. Subliminal communications do not inherently fall
within one of the groups of speech traditionally found to be outside
the protection of the first amendment. Consequently, the existing par-
adigms dealing with such speech cannot be applied to subliminal
speech. Further, the clear and present danger test would not be appli-
cable to subliminal communications because they do not meet the
immediate action qualification in Brandenburg. Thus, based on the
254. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (citation omitted).
255. Id
256. Id
257. The McCollum court stated:
This is particularly true when the artist's performance of such musical lyrics and
poetry was physically and temporarily remote from the listener who only
subsequently hears such performances by means of an electronic recording. The
circumstances and conditions under which the listener might receive such
performance are infinitely variable and totally beyond both the control and the
anticipation of the performing artists and the producers and distributors of the
recording.
Id. at 1002 n.10, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 194 n.10. Similarly, one could argue that subliminal
messages that are either recorded visually or audibly could not be viewed as a command for
immediate action because of intervening events and the length of time between recording a
subliminal message, receiving it, and acting upon it.
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existing tests, it is unclear how a subliminal message could ever pose a
clear and present danger, let alone an immediate one.
2. REGULATION OF THE FORM OF SPEECH
In addition to regulating the content of certain types of speech,
regulatory statutes which are "not intended to control the content of
speech but [which] incidentally limit ... its unfettered exercise,"2 8
have been constitutionally justified if the regulation serves a compel-
ling state interest and is narrowly tailored to accomplish a proper
state purpose.25 9 To pass constitutional muster, the governmental
interest must outweigh the constitutional interest against which it is
balanced. 2 'o As subliminal speech does not generally fall into one of
the specific categories of regulatable speech, governmental regulations
that indirectly limit speech pose a greater threat to subliminal speech
because these regulations are based on malleable concepts like notions
of privacy and individual autonomy.
For example, in Kovacs v. Cooper,2 61 the United States Supreme
Court upheld a city ordinance that prohibited persons using loud-
speakers or sound amplification devices from broadcasting on public
streets.26 2 The Court balanced the constitutional right to disseminate
ideas against the right of individuals to be free from distracting noises
within their homes.263 The Court upheld the statute concluding that
the "unwilling listener ... is helpless to escape this interference with
his privacy. ' 264 But, the right to privacy has its limitations. For
instance, in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,2 65 the Court held
that it was constitutionally permissible for a street railway vehicle to
play radio programs through its loudspeakers.26 In so holding, how-
ever, the Court explained that the right to privacy one enjoys in his
own home is substantially limited by the rights of others when he
travels on public thoroughfares or rides on public transportation.267
258. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1960).
259. See generally id.
260. Id
261. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
262. Id at 89.
263. Id. at 87.
264. Id. at 86-87.
265. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
266. Id
267. Id. at 464. "However complete his right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially
limited by the rights of others when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a
public conveyance." Id. Interestingly, when reviewing the facts of the case, the Commission
found that in the opinion of the bus operators, "the music on the vehicles had a tendency to
keep the passengers in a better mood, and that it simplified transit operations." Id at 459
(citation omitted). Perhaps this was due to subliminal effects of the music.
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When determining the extent to which privacy may be invaded,
the Court considers to what degree the individual is a captive audi-
ence.268 In Cohen v. California,269 the defendant was convicted of
maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket
with the words "Fuck the Draft" on it to protest the Vietnam War
and the draft.270 On appeal, the Court stated that:
[W]e are often "captives" outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech. The ability of the government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to
protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.271
The Court overturned Cohen's conviction, reasoning that unsuspect-
ing viewers could avoid further bombardment by "simply averting
their eyes."272 In Erzonznik v. City of Jacksonville,273 the Court
expanded on this point:
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our pluralis-
tic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of
expression, "we are inescapably captive audiences for many pur-
poses." Much that we encounter offends our aesthetic, if not our
political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution
does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise
protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for
the unwilling listener or viewer.274
Commentators have argued that subliminal communications
present a high degree of captivity because the recipient is unaware of
the subliminal transmission. Thus, he does not have the choice of
averting his eyes or shutting his ears.2" One could argue, however,
that subliminal message captive audience cases are distinguishable
from unwilling captive audience cases based on the element of plea-
sure. While the recipient of the subliminal message may not con-
sciously know that he is being exposed to a subliminal message, his
continued exposure results from his attraction to it. For example, a
person may enjoy viewing a piece of art work even though he- is
unable to describe exactly what it is about the art work that he likes.
Similarly, people view movies or listen to music because they find it
268. Note, Subconscious Taken Captive, supra note 17, at 1125-33.
269. 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see supra notes 261-68 and accompanying text.
270. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
271. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
272. Id
273. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
274. Id. at 210 (citation omitted).
275. Note, Subconscious Taken Captive, supra note 17, at 1131.
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somehow pleasurable. Additionally, because people bring many of
these items into their homes voluntarily, the element of captivity is
lessened if not removed.
Still, one commentator who believes that subliminal communica-
tion poses a high degree of captivity in and of itself, suggests that the
Court find this type of expression intrusive and that it require full
disclosure of all such transmissions.27 6 If this were the case, non-dis-
closure would trigger a new form of invasion of privacy action.277
The resulting litigation would not only diminish one's first amend-
ment right of expression, but would also be unfair. This is because
not all subliminal communication is manipulative or effective at con-
trolling future human behavior.2 78  Thus, any new cause of action
would have to be narrowly tailored so that only those persons exposed
to messages that were effective in manipulating or modifying behavior
could sue.2 7 9 This refinement could be analogized to the tort concept
of false imprisonment where no cause of action lies unless the plaintiff
knows he is being held against his will.280
276. I at 1131, 1138.
277. Although it does not approve of subliminal communications, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) opposed a California Bill requiring users of subliminal speech to
notify the public. The ACLU argued that the Bill would provide a private cause of action for
invasion of privacy against subliminal communicators. Kiesel, supra note 30, at 27.
278. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
279. One author suggests that "naturally occurring subliminal stimuli are not objectionable
as an infringement on the capacity of autonomy any more than other phenomena (such as the
weather) that evoke particular reaction and behavior." Gurnick, supra note 17, at 58 n.25.
This is because "natural subliminal stimuli lack the intent in their creation and movement
from source to recipient. Regulation[s] . . . can only apply to messages designed to affect
behavior of an unknowing recipient." Id. at 52-56.
It appears, however, that the line between what naturally occurs and what occurs
intentionally is hazy. For example, a women wearing a wedding band in a commercial or a
commercial taking place in a snow storm may subconsciously evoke a certain feeling or mood
which may appeal to a consumer's emotional need (perhaps the need for security, sex, or love
with respect to the wedding band and the need for shelter with respect to the snow storm). See
W. KEY, supra note 13, at 92-94, for an analysis on why an advertiser would have a women
model wear a wedding band in a commercial. While it can be said that the advertiser
purposely had the model wear the wedding band or the commercial take place in a snow
storm, it can also be said that the feelings subconsciously prompted occurred as naturally as if
the same subconscious feelings were triggered by actually seeing a women wearing a wedding
band or being caught in a an actual snow storm.
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).
§ 35 False Imprisonment
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment if
(a) he acts intending to confine the other or third person within boundaries
fixed by the actor, and
(b) his act directly or indirectly results in such confinement of the other,
and




The courts have not yet considered the effects that subliminal
messages may have on personal autonomy. Yet, if subliminal
messages can encourage a desired type of behavior, the question of
whether one's personal autonomy has been intolerably violated could
become the central issue and determine whether restrictions or disclo-
sure requirements are mandated.
B. Personal Autonomy
At the heart of the subliminal speech debate lie the sensitive
issues of personal autonomy and invasion of privacy. The mere men-
tion of subliminal communication to most people will conjure up
images of 1984, A Clockwork Orange, or A Brave New World2"1 and
the possibility of a nation of automatons controlled by some evil
genius. Protection of subliminal speech seems to conflict with the
value that society places on privacy,282 specifically, the sanctity
accorded to one's own mind, thoughts, and free will. Currently, how-
ever, there is no consensus on the effectiveness, if any, of subliminal
messages.283 Teachers, therapists, and parents could all testify as to
how difficult it is to alter one's behavior even when the individual is
motivated to change.2
One widely accepted view of the effectiveness of subliminal
speech is that while they cannot change people's attitudes, subliminal
messages may trigger a prior attitude or predisposition.285 Assuming
this is true, does it necessarily follow that one loses his autonomy if he
pursues an activity that has been subliminally suggested to him?
The general argument against subliminal communication is that
it is immoral because it violates individual autonomy.28 6 A counter
argument is that "it is hard to find anything very sinister about a
281. W. KEY, MEDIA SEXPLOrrATION, supra note 28, at 115.
282. Gurnick, supra note 17.
The value.., of the institutions of civil life lies in their operation as giving
reality to the capacities of will and reason . .. enabling them to be really
exercised. In their general effect ... they render it possible for a man to be freely
determined by the idea of a possible satisfaction of himself, instead of being
driven this way and that by external forces ... and they enable him to realize his
reason, i.e., his idea of self-perfection, by acting as a member of a social
organization in which each contributes to the better being of all.
I& at 56 (quoting Green, Principles of Political Obligation (1880), quoted in 12 BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 465 (1967)).
283. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
284. Moore, supra note 11, at 10.
285. Note, Subconscious Taken Captive, supra note 17, at 1089 (quoting Lander, In
Through the Out Door, OMNI, Feb. 1981, at 45).
286. Crisp, Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy, and the Creation of Desire, 6 J. Bus. ETHICS
413 (1987).
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science whose principal conclusion is that you get along with people
by giving them what they want."2 7 Thus, by appealing to our sublim-
inal desires-which are real desires just like our conscious desires-
new desires are not created. On the contrary, old desires are
satisfied.288
At least, theoretically, when we unknowingly purchase a product
or act in a certain way that has been subliminally suggested, we sub-
consciously believe we are satisfying a subliminal desire. This of
course assumes that the subliminal message touches off a subcon-
scious desire bypassing the 'pesky' calculating and reasoning ego
when the time comes to act.2 9 Further, if we continue to do the subli-
minally prescribed activity, we do so supposedly because the sublimi-
nal desire has been fulfilled. However, the more likely scenario is that
we continue doing the activity because it pleases our conscious,
rational desires, now that our reasoning ego gets into the act.290
Alternatively, if our subconscious desire is not fulfilled--or con-
sciously the product or activity is displeasing-we will cease doing
whatever has been subliminally suggested. In a sense, this is like a
self-regulating market (or political structure). Either we get what we
want or we move on (or vote the person out of power).
From this standpoint, it appears that the risk of violating one's
personal autonomy is incurred only if one initially acts because a sub-
liminally implanted message has aroused a subliminal desire. How-
ever, it is arguable whether one's autonomy is actually violated when
this occurs because the desire is original and not manufactured. Fur-
287. Arrington, Advertising and Behavior Control, I J. Bus. ETHICS 3, 5 (1982) (quoting V.
PACKARD, supra note 62, at 256).
288. Id. at 11.
289. Id Instead of trying to remove subliminal communications so that people will not
unknowingly be influenced to make "wrong" choices, a better technique to insure that people
make "correct" choices is by encouraging education, religion, and societal and familial values.
In a similar vein, Justice Brandeis stated: "Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be
applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
378 (1926) (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring).
290. It should be kept in mind, however, that subliminal stimuli must compete with
stronger, supraliminal stimuli. This, in turn, diminishes the effectiveness of the subliminal
stimulus.
Because subliminal stimuli are constrained by definition to be weak-to be
otherwise would make for a supraliminal stimulus--subliminal stimuli are at a
general disadvantage relative to competing supraliminal stimuli. Indeed, even
stimuli normally perceived to be supraliminal may be filtered out of conscious
awareness if competing stimuli are of greater importance. Thus, for subliminal
stimuli to be effective, they must first successfully compete with all the
supraliminal stimuli that demand attention.
Weinstein, Drozdenko & Weinstein, supra note 58, at 3 (citations omitted).
1280
SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION
ther, "most of us have a benevolent subconscious which does not
overwhelm our ego and its reason for action." 29 ' Thus, because our
subconscious is kept in check by our reasoning ego, we are able to
"respond to subliminal [transmissions] without risking our
autonomy. '292
V. CONCLUSION
As technology advances, it is inevitable that new forms of com-
munication, some not yet considered, will be developed and cause
clashes between claims of privacy and free speech. Subliminal com-
munication is but one small example. While subliminal perception is
not a new idea, technology has progressed so that the sphere of people
who are exposed to such communications has been greatly increased.
It appears, however, that, at least for now, a restriction on subliminal
speech would be a knee-jerk reaction to undifferentiated fears. The
scientific evidence regarding the effectiveness of subliminal suggestion
is unclear at best. Further, because of the prevalence of intentional,
inadvertent, or naturally occurring subliminal communications, regu-
lations would be difficult, if not impossible, to fashion. Also, at least
with respect to artistic expression, subliminal techniques have been
employed for generations and are protected under the first amend-
ment. If a painter could be held liable for subliminally embedding the
word "DEATH" in his painting or a musician could be found respon-
sible for the suicide death of a fan, all art forms would potentially be
chilled. Artists would fear being prosecuted for some message that
someone found in the work. Finally, it should not be assumed that
humans, as thinking, rational beings, need paternalistic protection of
laws restricting subliminal transmissions. It is hard to believe that
subliminal suggestion can summarily wipe out a person's normative
values that have been instilled by society and cause that person to
pursue activities that he or she would not normally do. I, for one,
think people deserve more credit.
SCOT SILVERGLATE
291. Arrington, supra note 287, at 10.
292. Id
1990] 1281
